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Testing of VoIP security problems is essential to enterprises providing real-time data and ser-
vices. The critical infrastructure can be compromised and data to be regularly exposed. This in-
formation may be used by malicious hackers for illegal purposes. At the same time consumers 
are connecting their smartphones and other personal devices to the network. The business with 
private and secured data is becoming more and more important in our everyday life. 
 
The major security threat for enterprises today is discovering existing unknown vulnerabilities 
from used software. Unknown vulnerabilities may cause a lot of serious problems, attacks utilizing 
security holes may continue undetected (while customer safety is compromised) and the repair 
process tends to be slow once an attack is detected. Additionally, during maintenance there is 
downtime when customer services are not accessible. Naturally, all downtime is damaging com-
pany reputation and eventually affecting to company profits. Security related bugs are likely to 
exist in platforms when facing with new technologies which are complex to implement and when 
software versions are often a released detriment of testing. Also, an increasing number of vulner-
abilities have not been published but instead those may end to be used and shared within under-
ground hacker communities. Companies and enterprises need to find preventive actions to pro-
tect their products and services because it takes too much time to wait fixed software releases 
from vendors. 
 
In this thesis work the protocol model from a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) is im-
plemented using the Codenomicon Test Tool platform. The product can send valid and anoma-
lous data transmissions to the test application over the Internet. This is technique (or testing 
method) called fuzzing or fuzz testing. Software robustness can be verified and unknown or zero-
day vulnerabilities may be found with fuzzing. 
 
RTP data is typically audio, video or other streaming content. RTP data (or media stream) is usu-
ally transferred and embedded within another protocol. The SRTP Test Suite can utilize other 
Codenomicon test tools to do media signaling negotiation with the test targets in a way which is 
secure when it comes to cryptography. Thus, the result of the connection parameters may be 
used to get connected with a wider variety of test targets and send an SRTP fuzzing data stream 
to these applications. 
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VoIP-järjestelmien turvallisuuden testaaminen on oleellista yrityksille, jotka tuottavat reaaliaikaista 
tietoa ja palveluita. Kriittinen infrastruktuuri ja salatut tiedot voivat olla jatkuvassa paljastumisvaa-
rassa. Tämä tieto voi olla vihamielisien hakkereiden laittomassa käytössä. Samaan aikaan kulut-
tajat liikkuvat tietoverkoissa älypuhelimilla ja muilla henkilökohtaisilla laitteilla. Yksityisellä ja sala-
tulla tiedolla tehtävä kaupankäynti ja siihen rinnastettavat tehtävät ovat jokapäiväistä elämää. 
 
Yritysten merkittävä turvallisuusuhka on löytää olemassa olevat tuntemattomat haavoittuvuudet 
käytetyistä ohjelmistoista. Tuntemattomat haavoittuvuudet voivat aiheuttaa useita vakavia ongel-
mia, hyökkäykset, jotka hyödyntävät tietoturva-aukkoja, voivat jatkua huomaamatta (samaan ai-
kaan kun asiakasturvallisuus on paljastumisvaarassa) ja korjausprosessit saattavat olla pitkäkes-
toisia kun hyökkäys on havaittu. Lisäksi kunnossapito on häiriöaikaa, jolloin asiakaspalvelut eivät 
ole saatavilla. Luonnollisesti edellinen tila vaurioittaa yrityksen mainetta ja lopulta vaikuttaa yrityk-
sen tulokseen. Tietoturvaan liittyvät viat ovat todennäköisiä alustoilla, jotka käyttävät uutta tekno-
logiaa ja joiden toteutus on päätynyt monimutkaiseksi kokonaisuudeksi. Tietoturvallisuus vaaran-
tuu, jos ohjelmistoversiot julkaistaan testauksen kustannuksella. Myös lisääntyvä määrä haavoit-
tuvuuksia jää hakkeriyhteisöjen salaiseksi tiedoksi. Yritysten täytyy löytää ennaltaehkäiseviä kei-
noja turvata omat tuotteet ja palvelut, koska vie liian kauan aikaa odottaa toimittajan julkaisuja 
ohjelmistokorjauksista.  
 
Tässä opinnäytetyössä toteutetaan protokollamalli suojatusta reaaliaikaisesta tietoliikenneproto-
kollasta (SRTP) käyttäen Codenomicon-testaustyökalualustaa. Tuote voi lähettää aitoja ja epäta-
vallisia protokollaviestejä tietoverkon yli testattavalle sovellukselle. Tätä tekniikkaa (tai testausme-
todia) kutsutaan nimellä fuzzing-testaus. Ohjelmiston kelpoisuus voidaan varmistaa sekä tunte-
mattomat ja nollapäivän haavoittuvuudet voidaan löytää fuzzing-testauksella. 
 
RTP-tieto on tyypillisesti ääntä, kuvaa tai muuta suoratoisto sisältöä. Tieto (tai median suoratois-
to) siirretään tavallisesti sulautettuna sisältönä osana jotain muuta tiedonsiirtoprotokollaa. SRTP-
testaustyökalu voi hyödyntää toista Codenomiconin testaustyökalua tekemään siirrettävälle me-
dialle signalointineuvottelun kryptograafisesti turvallisella tavalla yhdessä testauskohteen kanssa. 
Siten yhteysparametreja voidaan käyttää yhteydenmuodostukseen laajemman testauskohteiden 
valikoiman kanssa ja lähettää SRTP fuzzing-testauksen testitapauksia tietovirtana näille sovelluk-
sille. 
 
 
Asiasanat: 
fuzzing-testaus, tietoturva, kryptografia, salakirjoitus, salausmenetelmät, autentikaatio 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is a technique and group of technologies for transferring a 
voice communications over the Internet Protocol (IP) based networks. The VoIP benefits and at-
tractiveness for enterprises and organizations point of view are the cost-effectiveness, the flexibil-
ity and a possibility to utilize the existing network for voice communication. Some enterprises 
have taken the VoIP in part of their internal communications and also for the customer service. 
(Takanen & Vuontisjarvi 2011, 2.) 
 
Although VoIP, similar terms like of an IP Telephony and Converged Networks which all have 
slightly different definitions, those are often used interchangeably. With these used terms, are 
referring to the structures and processes from design and implementation of a common network-
ing infrastructure which handles data, voice and multimedia communications. In the first decade 
of 21th century, main focus was in the voice. The enthusiasm was to replace the circuit-switched 
voice with the packet-switched voice within the enterprise and at home over network connections. 
(Porter 2005, 6.) 
 
The unknown vulnerabilities are software defects and bugs not yet to be discovered. While known 
vulnerabilities are blocked and excluded with the software patches and updates, security holes of 
the unknown vulnerabilities remain in the system after every software update. Vulnerabilities in 
applications providing a customer interfaces are commonly used way for a hacker to attack to-
ward an enterprise and steal trusted information. Fixing of the software vulnerabilities in precau-
tionary should be on a high priority. Firewalls and antivirus software does not offer protection for a 
security holes but increases overall system complexity. An augmented complexity is on the other 
hand a threat because then the hidden attack surface of the system is increased. The hacker may 
gain entry to a VPN connected system via another user in a same network which is not aware of 
the cracked entry. (Takanen & Juuso 2010, 2.) 
 
A cryptographic mechanism plays a crucial role in securing signaling negotiation and media 
stream connections. The cryptography is a vast field and supports a large number of applications. 
Some of those (for example a Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)) are studied in this thesis 
work. The cryptography is area of the science where a public channel messages are protected 
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with the security services. These services are confidentiality, integrity protection and authentica-
tion.  
 
This thesis work questions/main tasks are: 
- produce a new version of the model based fuzzer for the secure rtp (the model and the test suite 
are fully rewritten to support the current platform generation) 
- study of the secure rtp signaling (key exchanges) and implement part of these. Which signaling 
environments are the most useful for the rtp fuzzing?  
 
Smaller implementation and studying subtasks or goals are: 
- SRTP model creation (grammar and model structures) 
- SRTP controller creation (Java component) 
- AES in Counter mode (Java crypto component) 
- MIKEY-PSK method (Java crypto component) 
 
1.1 Basic concepts and terms 
 
A short introduction of the essential concepts in this thesis is given in this chapter. 
 
|| denotes concatenation of two variables. For an example, in C = A || B the most significant bits 
of the C are total bits of the A and the least significant bits are equal to the bits of the B. 
 
An attribute Grammar is “an extension of a context-free grammar having attribute associated to 
the grammar symbol” (Kaksonen 2001, 43) 
 
The context-Free Grammar is also called a Backbus-Naur Form (BNF). It basically describes the 
syntax notation of language and the message format of a protocol.  
 
A Zero-day vulnerability (or zero-day attack) the first sentence is meaning a previously unknown 
vulnerability in a computer application which has no patch to fix the vulnerability. The second sen-
tence means the attack with utilizes a security hole that is not known by a software developer. 
Attackers may share zero-day exploits with themselves before the attack against the software. 
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1.2 Fuzzing 
 
Fuzzing is identified as a black box testing, as it does not need any access to a System Under 
Test (SUT) source code. During a test process, the SUT is exposed to the malformed data and 
robustness abilities in these conditions are tested. 
 
The core principle of the fuzzing is described in a nutshell: 
 
“Fuzzing or fuzz testing is a negative software testing method that feeds a program, de-
vice or system with malformed and unexpected input data in order to find defects” 
(Codenomicon 2014, date of retrieval 6.1.2014) 
 
Fuzzing enables software testers and designers to find defects which can be triggered using mal-
formed inputs via the external interfaces. With this ability, fuzzing (or fuzz testing) covers exposed 
and critical attack surfaces relatively well. It also identifies common software errors and vulnera-
bilities.  (Codenomicon 2014, date of retrieval 6.1.2014) 
 
The software programs which are used to run and create the fuzz testing are called fuzzers. Cou-
ple real-life examples of these is a tool which sends malformed Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP) requests to a web server or other one which sends Routing Information Protocol (RIP) 
version 2 routing requests with invalid cryptographic fields. 
 
1.2.1 Static vs model based fuzzing 
 
A fuzzer can be commonly categorized to the static and the model-based fuzzers. The static or 
non-stateful fuzzer may not do any kind of a security testing after begin point of a protocol. In the 
contrast, a fully model-based fuzzer is able to penetrate more on the tested protocol and thus 
leading to be more effective in discovering the security flaws and vulnerabilities. The static fuzz-
ers are missing of the ability to do protocol runtime operations such as length or cryptographic 
operations and calculations or replacing elements from the incoming messages to the outgoing 
messages. (Codenomicon 2014, date of retrieval 8.1.2014) 
 
The model based fuzzer design is introduced in chapter 3 in more detail. 
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1.3 Introduction to cryptographis mechanisms 
 
When building a component with the cryptographic services, following services and concepts 
need to be studied and observed. In generally, a cryptographic algorithm determines the data 
transformation. Algorithm receives a data block which security services need to be provided with 
a key as input parameters. The data blocks are fixed-length sequences of the bits (data may be 
padded with the zero bits to get the data block of desired length). An algorithms based on the key 
type can be divided on the symmetric or the public (or asymmetric) key cryptography. To produce 
secure communication in the symmetric key cryptography each parties need to agree on a shared 
key. The encryption and decryption keys are usually identical and can be derived from shared 
key. This concept is named as a cipher or ciphering. The ciphers are divided to a block and a 
stream ciphers and internally for both: the functionality or the cryptographic mode. Modes are 
used to add Boolean XOR operations and the feedback additions to the basic ciphering calcula-
tions. As a result of these additions, the different ciphertext output is generated in each round of 
the calculation from identical plaintext input. On the asymmetric algorithm, key pairs (private and 
public key) are used in the public key cryptography. A private key is used for the encryption and 
public key for decryption. A public key can be derived from a private key and not usable in vice 
versa. (Sisalem et al. 2009, 6) 
 
The trusted and reliable security needs following cryptographic services. Firstly, the confidentiality 
consists of two inverses processes, called an encryption and a decryption. The encryption of data 
enables a sender of data to transform a plaintext message (which is for example our normal writ-
ten text) into the ciphertext using a secret key. A data in the ciphertext format seems to be ran-
domized sequence of the bits when viewed by a third party and it’s not possible to do inverse op-
eration of the encryption (decryption) for recovering data back to the plaintext without using a key 
and proper cipher algorithm. Because of the cipher specifications, algorithms and modes are pub-
lic documented, the mode security depends on the secrecy of the key. Secondly, the integrity pro-
tection enables a recipient to ensure that the received message content is the original and a 
packet has not been tampered during path of a transmission. Any kind of changes to the data 
causes failure in the data integrity. Thirdly, the data authentication enables the recipient can rely 
and confirm that the received message is sent from the originator entity who was initially declared 
to be sender. (sp800-38a_Block_Cipher_Modes; Sisalem et al. 2009, 5) 
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1.3.1 Block and stream ciphers 
 
A block cipher is used to transform one block of a plaintext (P) to corresponding block size of a 
ciphertext (C) using a shared (secret) key (K). Inverse operation recovers a plaintext from a ci-
phertext.  
 
FORMULA 1.  Encryption and decryption operations of a block cipher 
    (  )                  (  )  where 
E = Encryption 
D = Decryption 
i = Block index 
 
A stream cipher is used to perform the bit-XOR operations between an input stream and a key-
stream of the same length. Due to these operations those are called an additive ciphers. The key 
generator produces the keystream which must be a pseudorandom stream of bits. The stream 
cipher implementation may utilize the block ciphers and the cryptographic modes. Then the key-
stream is generated by the block cipher. (Sisalem et al. 2009, 7) 
 
FORMULA 2.  Encryption and decryption operations of a stream cipher 
                               where 
C = Ciphertext 
P = Plaintext 
K = Keystream 
  = XOR operation 
i = Bit index 
 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is well-known a symmetric block cipher algorithm. The AES 
uses a data block or sequences of 128 bits (digits with values of 0 or 1) as an input block and 
produces same size of an output block as a result. The cipher may be initialized with the key 
lengths of 128, 198 or 256 bits. (FIPS AES 2001)  
 
Some modes of the operation are requiring a random data block called the Initialization Vector 
(IV) as an additional input block. Depending on the operation mode the input block (plaintext or 
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ciphertext) and IV can be XOR-ed together. The IV has to be unpredictable for the Cipher Block 
Chaining (CBC) and the Cipher Feedback (CFB) modes and unique (*nonce, a value that is used 
only once) for the Output Feedback (OFB) and the Counter (CTR) modes for each execution 
round of encryption process to maintain cryptographic message confidentiality. The IV does not 
need to be secret and IV itself or calculation information of the IV can be transferred with the ci-
phertext. For the CTR mode of operation an increasing counter value (nonce) is added to the IV. 
(Dworkin 2001) 
 
The CTR mode is synchronous stream cipher where a keystream generation is an independent 
functionality. When the block cipher is used to generate keystream then the keystream is multiple 
of the block size. Possible leftover data of the plaintext or the ciphertext is discarded. Pros of the 
stream ciphers for encrypting real-time media are no padding is needed, sender can pre-compute 
the keystream and confidentiality operations can be run in parallel. Con side is that the keystream 
must not be used more than once or otherwise the plaintext (and also the keystream when ci-
phertext and plaintext are XOR-ed) is easy to break after using of the ciphertext produced by 
same keystream. The keystream reuse is called a “two-time pad”. The stream ciphers are also 
vulnerable to the bit flipping, if an attacker knows of the plaintext then he/she can alter the cipher-
text so that the end result of plaintext has corrupted. To protect these effects, a Message Authen-
tication Code (MAC) must be used. Following FIGURE 1. Counter (CTR) Mode describes CTR 
mode of an operation. The Initialization Vector (IV) is combination of reused nonce and counter 
value making the IV as unique input parameter for each round of the encryption. The keystream 
is encryption result of the IV and a key value. The ciphertext is generated by the XOR operation 
with corresponding keystream and plaintext. In decryption, a plaintext is recovered after the XOR 
operation with a keystream and a ciphertext. (Sisalem et al. 2009, 9-11) 
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FIGURE 1. Counter (CTR) Mode 
 
1.3.2 Pseudorandom functions 
 
A pseudorandom function (PRF) is used to produce output (a secret key) value that can not be 
distinguished from a random data. A key establishment protocol may be used to create a shared 
secret between two parties. An additional session keying material is generated from the shared 
secret key. A key material is necessary because cryptographic operations are requiring number 
of session keys and longer keystreams than length of the shared secret. The session keys are 
used to protect protocol signaling and transmission of a media data. The keys need to be distinct 
for session parties and may need to be deviant for each data streams within one session. The 
PRF applies recursively a keyed-Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) or a cipher to 
produce mathematically strong keying material. The PRF uses a secret key as it operational input 
with a block or sequence of random numbers with defined constant values to ensure produced 
session keys are distinct. (Sisalem et al. 2009, 11) 
 
1.3.3 Cryptographic hash functions 
 
A cryptographic hash function takes message as input and produces a digest which is a fixed size 
result of mathematical transformation. (with a some hash function calculation deviations digest 
may be called also a message digest, a hash value or digital fingerprint). In a cryptographic func-
Keystream[n] Keystream[2] Keystream[1] Keystream[0] 
Plaintext[n] Plaintext[2] Plaintext[1] Plaintext[0] 
Key 
IV+ counter (=0) 
Ciphertext[0] 
E 
IV + 1 
Ciphertext[1] 
E Key 
 
IV + 2 
Ciphertext[2] 
E Key 
  
IV + n 
Ciphertext[n] 
E Key 
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tion family a Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA) and a Message-Digest Algorithm (MD5) are widely 
used. The MD5 produces a 128 bit length of digest. There are known collision and password 
cracking vulnerabilities of the MD5 hash functions. The most widely used by applications and pro-
tocols of the SHA family is SHA-1 but it contains known (theoretical) cryptographic weakness. 
The SHA-1 has seen as successor of MD5 and it produces a 160 bit length of digest. Integrity 
protection of cryptographic algorithm is enabled by calculating the hash value over the message 
and a secret key value. This concept is called the HMAC presented in previous chapter.  (Sisalem 
et al. 2009, 20-21; Stevens 2012) 
 
1.3.4 Threats and vulnerabilities 
 
To the produce secure communication following components or concepts are required: 
 Mutual authentication for determine presented credentials 
 Key exchange for obtain shared secret 
 Symmetric cryptographic algorithms for integrity-protected and confidential communica-
tion 
An attacker aims to break trusted communication via deciphering confidential messages, to inject 
manipulated data into the communication channel, replay messages with valid or invalid content 
or in generally tries to disturb a data exchange between two parties. To get access of a plaintext 
messages an attacker have to acquire the secret key which was used to encrypt the data. There 
are number of alternatives to achieve this. (Sisalem et al. 2009, 38-39) 
 
If a cryptographic algorithm is tried to break, a ciphertext can be used to mount a ciphertext-only 
attack. It’s basic form is a brute force attack. In the brute force attack form, all possible keys are 
tried systemically. This type of an attack is useful for relatively small key sizes because it may 
require use all of the possible key values until correct one is found. The attacker may also exploit 
weakness of the cryptographic algorithm, for example of a weak key. The weak keying makes the 
cipher work predictable ways. Use of a random value in encryption is efficient for preventing pre-
dictive nature of the used encryption key. If sections or linking between a plaintext and a cipher-
text are known, it may lead to a known-plaintext attack. The message headers and padding are in 
generally public or at least easily to guess. This attack form is more efficient if a manipulated 
plaintext can targeted to specific one which then yields to a chosen-plaintext attack. One use 
case of the latter is the differential cryptanalysis where pairs of plaintexts are producing a con-
stant difference (a statistical and frequent pattern to ciphertext). This may be exploited to deter-
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mine the most probable keys to for encryption. The attacker may also detect exploit of how cryp-
tographic algorithm is used, the keystream reuse is most known use case in this category. The 
implementation of the cryptographic algorithm may reveal valuable information to a skillful attack-
er. One use case is a timing attack which can reveal used algorithm and furthermore lead the 
breaking of used key by measuring time to decrypt a group of known ciphertexts. For protection 
to the timing attack the cipher processing can be blurred with additional delay time in range of 
tolerating decreased performance. (Sisalem et al. 2009, 39) 
 
Protection against replay attacks can be achieved by adding randomness in each round of mes-
sage exchange. In a Denial of Service (DOS) type of attack, a person is disturbing the communi-
cation between two parties but not necessary accessing the private information. The key ex-
change protocols are also vulnerable to the attacks. One use case is a man-in-the-middle-attack 
where an attacker is located between two parties and accessible to the keying material ex-
changed. Latter can be mount to a bid-down-attack where attacker interferes the session negotia-
tion in such way that target of the attack chooses security mechanism which the attacker can 
break more easily. Protection against these types of the attacks can be achieved by mutual au-
thentication and with integrity protection in the key exchange. An attacker may also combine latter 
and DOS attacks to key negotiation to slow down or crash target by this way. (Sisalem et al. 
2009, 39-40) 
 
It may seem that the security issue is not a big problem because the cryptography services are 
providing to numerous if not all the security problems. In the every-day practice these problems 
are real. The main reasons are: security mechanisms are not fully deployed or are not used at all, 
components using their own security mechanisms are not interoperable with each other (leading 
to complementing mutual services or causing security holes) or protocols which require involve-
ment of intermediate entities may lead to communication participants have to trust third parties in 
the security issues. In a practice, an architectural complexity is frequently causing security vul-
nerabilities. In this category typical use cases are introduced. Firstly, when a key exchange proto-
col is piggy-backed to signaling protocol. Examples of the first protocols are SDES and MIKEY 
and latter SIP. In this case a media plane security depends on security of a signaling plane. Sec-
ondly, when signaling plane and media plane are operating independently. In this case, a crypto-
graphic binding between places is needed. Examples of the media plane key exchange protocols 
are ZRTP and DTLS-SRTP. (Sisalem et al. 2009, 40-41) 
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2 VOIP COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA SECURITY 
 
The VoIP is commonly used term of delivering voice communications and multimedia sessions 
over the IP in today’s conversation and technical (also commercial) articles. Term is not referring 
to any particular protocol specification but rather to the protocol family used co-operatively to-
gether. Each protocol has specific functions and responsibilities such as the call creation, the sig-
naling or media data transfer. The signaling protocols are used to establish and control call ses-
sions. The keying protocol’s task is to perform key exchange and negotiate the cryptographic pa-
rameters. Media transfer protocol’s task is to transfer video and audio data packets between par-
ticipants of (media) session. Mainly these protocols are based on open standards (like Session 
Initiation Protocol (SIP), H.323 or RTP) and others are based on proprietary standards (like 
Skype). Transferred packets are delivered either on a Transport Control Protocol (TCP) for relia-
ble transport services or on User Datagram Protocol (UDP) for quick deliveries of packets with 
minimal overhead and delay. The TCP packet delivery is distinguishingly connection based and 
the UDP has connectionless packet delivery (which means it can’t guarantee reliable packet de-
livery). 
 
The VoIP (media) packets are most often transferred on UDP. The RTP tasks are to transfer 
voice and video data packets with offering fast end-to-end packet delivery. Because of the UDP is 
distinguishingly connectionless in delivering packets, the RTP is most commonly located on top of 
the UDP. Characteristics of the RTP is introduced in chapter 2.2 Media Transfer and Security 
Issues and it’s subchapters. 
 
The SIP has increasingly gained in popularity and it has become de-facto standard in a VoIP sig-
naling. The SIP also has some competing protocols, such as H.323, MGCP/Megaco and Skype. 
First was greatest rival in the 1990s with key difference in binary encoding allowing better perfor-
mance than SIP (which is text encoded protocol). The strengths in text encoding are easier de-
bugging, doing of modifications and integration to applications. The second competitor is based 
on traditional telephony approach. This is causing that new features need to introduce simultane-
ously in telephone and in network. With the SIP it is enough that the telephones agree on ser-
vices and changes to the network are rarely needed. MGCP/Megago-based VoIP development 
exists today in France. Skype, as the last rival is proprietary standard. It’s secured against com-
mon security threats and reverse engineering. A closed environment is also a great weakness 
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because technology companies prefer to support open standards and environments instead. 
While VoIP gets more popular, it attracts also illegitimate users and hackers to interference and to 
intrude call and media sessions. For the VoIP to succeed in the long term, services must offer 
and guarantee the security and protection to the user. (Sisalem, Floroiu, Kuthan, Abend & Schul-
zrinne 2009, 2, 44) 
 
Security threats with some example qualities can be commonly categorized as follows: 
 Social threats, containing unsolicited calls, privacy, identity theft and fraud. 
 Eavesdropping, containing monitoring of signaling and media information  
 Interception and modification, containing intercepting exchanged eavesdropping data 
or with access to the VoIP service components, an intruder can reroute and block calls 
or degrade of call quality.  
 Service abuse, containing bypassing a provider authentication, stealing the service 
(from user) or launching attacks to users or service providers. 
 Interruption of service, containing DOS attacks aiming to make service unavailable to 
users. (Sisalem et al. 2009, 3) 
 
Call creation and signaling with the SIP is introduced next.  
 
2.1 Call creation and signaling with SIP 
 
The SIP standard has been designed to allow participating devices or applications to setup and 
teardown (ie terminate active call session) a multimedia sessions such as a voice calls over the 
Internet. The voice calls can be created between two or more participants. An operational behav-
ior model has been inherited from the email world. User belongs on to own administrative do-
main. User’s software application communicates with each other inside and outside of their ad-
ministrative domains. Domains are identified by Domain Name System (DNS) names which are 
shown in latter part of users’ addresses. Abstract network topology called SIP trapezoid is pre-
sented in FIGURE 2. The SIP Trapezoid (Sisalem et al. 2009, 43, 49) 
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FIGURE 2. The SIP Trapezoid 
 
Human faces on bottom corners of the trapezoid are representing end-users (ie SIP telephones 
or softphones which human users are using to talk each other). Signaling path is represented by 
softphones communicating inside their domain with the SIP servers (located on top corners) and 
further SIP servers communicating between domains. Packetized voice data transferred by the 
RTP is represented on dashed line. Prerequisite condition for this packet transfer is that phones 
have found each other and agreed of voice session and data encoding. (Sisalem et al. 2009, 49) 
 
2.1.1 Session definition and configuration 
 
In generally when initiating a VoIP calls or media streaming there is need to transfer media pa-
rameters such as transport address, media port and codec information. The session parameters 
are described in session invitation with a Session Description Protocol (SDP). The SDP may be 
used as protocol payload with appropriate transport protocol such as the SIP. Carrying of the 
session descriptions allow two participants to agree (ie negotiate) on a set of compatible media 
types. (Handley, Jacobson, Perkins, date of retrieval 16.3.2014) 
 
Session description in the SDP format includes information of: media type, media format, 
transport protocol, the IP address for media and port for media. Session parameters are defined, 
by <type>=<value> notation, on session level followed by zero or more media level definitions. 
john@doe.com 
192.168.0.1 
 
doe.com 
 
SIP signaling 
Kuva 1 
SIP SIP 
bar.com 
Packetized voice (RTP data) 
Kuva 1 
foo@bar.com 
192.168.0.16 
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Session level starts from “v=” parameter and continues until first media level parameter which is 
“m=”. Session level definitions are valid for entire session unless overwritten by equivalent media 
level parameter. (Handley et al., date of retrieval 16.3.2014) 
 
Example of a SDP payload is shown below 
 
v=0 
o=jdoe 2890844526 2890842807 IN IP4 10.47.16.5 
s=SDP Seminar 
i=A Seminar on the session description protocol 
u=http://www.example.com/seminars/sdp.pdf 
e=j.doe@example.com (Jane Doe) 
c=IN IP4 224.2.17.12/127 
t=2873397496 2873404696 
a=recvonly 
m=audio 49170 RTP/AVP 0 
m=video 51372 RTP/AVP 99 
a=rtpmap:99 h263-1998/90000 
 
which is explained in details by Handley et al. By RTP point of view the most important session 
and media level attributes are connection data “c=”, media descriptions “m=” and those attribute 
definitions “a=”. 
 
2.2 Media Transfer and Security Issues 
 
The service providers and the end users are expecting secure architecture functionality that co-
vers also exchanged media traffic in addition to the signaling messages. Feasibility of the secur-
ing data for multimedia communications in an end-to-end manner is an important question. There 
are legal as well as technical perspectives ahead. From the legal side of view, it must be possible 
to decrypt of the specific data by a third party on the basis of interception warrant and without 
participation of original parties. From the technical side of view, some middleware boxes need 
access to do the data processing of unencrypted (plain) data. Therefore, an end-to-middle securi-
ty model is necessary in such scenarios. (Sisalem et al. 2009, 174) 
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2.2.1 The Real-Time Transport Protocol 
 
The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) specifica-
tion as Request For Comments (RFC) 3550. The latter is commonly utilized for a real-time com-
munication over the Internet. The RTP provides end-to-end audio and video packet delivery ser-
vices. These services are including the payload identification, sequence numbering, time stamp-
ing and delivery monitoring. The RTP is most typically run on top of the UDP. The RTP has no 
information of a connection and it has no length information. Maximum length of the packets is 
limited by underlying protocols. The audio and video media packets are transmitted on a separate 
RTP sessions. (Schulzrinne, Casner, Frederick, Jacobson, date of retrieval 12.1.2014) 
 
The sub-protocol called RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) is defined and included within of the RTP 
specification. The RTCP monitors quality of service and conveys information of the participants of 
on-going session. These packets are usually transferred one port number higher than the RTP 
packet’s port. Exception to latter is when the RTP/RTCP packets are multiplexed ie those can be 
sent from a single port number. When the packets are multiplexed, it need to be informed with the 
SDP parameter a=rtcp-mux. Deviating from the RTP packets, each RTCP packet contains length 
information in a 32-bit word minus one meaning zero length for packets including only the RTCP 
header part. (Schulzrinne et al. 2003, date of retrieval 26.11.2014) 
 
The RTP data packet contains following fields (with short field descriptions): 
 Version (V): 2 bits, the version of the RTP 
 Padding (P): 1 bit, the packet contains one or more additional padding octets if bit is set 
to 1. 
 Extension (X): 1 bit, the packet contains one extension header if bit is set to 1. 
 CSRC Count (CC): 4 bits, the number of included CSRC identifiers 
 Marker (M): 1 bit, signaling bit of significant events defined by the RTP profile 
 Payload Type (PT): 7 bits, identifier of the RTP payload format 
 Sequence Number: 16 bits, an incremented number for each sent RTP packet 
 Timestamp: 32 bits, the timestamp value of sampled RTP packet 
 SSRC: 32 bits, the synchronization source identifier (chosen by random) 
 CSRS list: 0 to 15 items, 32 bits each, the contributing sources which number is identi-
fied by CC field 
 
 
  
 
 
 21 
The RTCP packet header contains following fields: 
 Version (V): 2 bits, the version of the RTP 
 Padding (P): 1 bit, as with the RTP, included either with an individual or a compound 
RTCP packet. Note, only the last individual RTCP packet P bit MUST be set to 1 with 
compound RTCP packet including padding. 
 Reception Report Count (RC): 5 bits, a number of contained RC blocks 
 Packet Type (PT): 8 bits, identifies format of the RTCP packet 
 Length: 16 bits, the length of RTCP packet excluding length of the RTCP 32 bit header 
(from version until length field itself) 
 SSRC: 32 bits, the synchronization source identifier for originator of current packet 
 
Above RTCP header is following one or more information packets: 
 RR: Receiver report, for transmission and reception statistics of not active senders 
 SR: Sender report, for transmission and reception statistics of active senders 
 SDES: Source description items, describing session member information 
 BYE: Indicates end of session member participation 
 APP: Contains application specific information 
(Schulzrinne et al. 2003, date of retrieval 12.1.2014) 
 
The RTP packet format is visually illustrated on TABLE 1  (SRTP Master Key Identifier (MKI) and 
Authentication Tag fields are not included) and RTCP on TABLE 2 (E bit, SRTCP index, SRTCP 
MKI and Authentication Tag fields are not included) respectively. All fields are in a plain data for-
mat being different from the table definitions. 
 
2.2.2 Secure RTP 
 
The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) was developed to provide the security services 
(such as the confidentiality and the integrity for RTP and RTCP packets) for the RTP based audio 
and video media transmission. Developers behind produced security features were the develop-
ment teams from Cisco and Ericsson companies. The specification was formally published by the 
IETF specification RFC 3711. The SRTP extends of the RFC 3550 specification providing an en-
cryption, an authentication and a integrity services for the RTP media stream. 
 
Requirements of the SRTP audio and video packet transmission is a high throughput with low 
packet expansion. Therefore use of the any additional headers and payload fields need to be 
  
 
 
 22 
avoided. Due to the header compression mechanism, the RTP header fields need to be left un-
encrypted and are available for possible eavesdropper. A decryption of encrypted payloads must 
succeed without some of the datagrams are lost and the decryption of the data stream must be 
possible to launch before all packets of the stream are received. Due to the previous, cipher re-
quirements created on a cryptographic security services are based on the PRF for the secure key 
creation, an additive stream cipher for the encryption/decryption, the HMAC for message authen-
tication and packet indexing unit creation for IV’s of SRTP/SRTCP (introduced later on this chap-
ter).  (Baugher, McGrew, Naslund, Carrara, Norrman, 2004, date of retrieval 26.1.2014; Sisalem 
et al. 2009, 175-176) 
 
The SRTP itself produces additional services which are increasing security. Firstly, distinct ses-
sion keys for the confidentiality and the integrity protection of SRTP and SRTCP streams are de-
rived from a single master key in a cryptographically secure way. Secondly, the key derivation 
can periodically refresh session keys. Thirdly, utilize of a salting keys. The master salt key offers 
protection and additional entropy for the key derivation functionality. Plus, the derived session salt 
key used in encryption protects against of attacks toward of additive stream cipher. (Baugher et 
al. 2004, date of retrieval 26.1.2014) 
 
2.2.2.1 SRTP framework 
 
Conceptually, the SRTP can be thought to be a “bump in the stack” implementation which oper-
ates as a secure moderator between the RTP application and the transport layer. The RTP pack-
et is modified to the SRTP packet format and sent to a receiver. Respectively, the received SRTP 
packet is intercepted to the RTP format. (Baugher et al. 2004, date of retrieval 26.1.2014) 
 
The SRTP packet format is illustrated on TABLE 1. Single B character in the first table row de-
scribes bits from 0 until 7 so there are totally 4 bytes in each row. The P+A is describing plain 
(readable) data row which belongs to authenticated portion of RTP packet. The E+A is describing 
encrypted and authenticated data portion. The single P character is describing plain data only 
portion, which may be included to the SRTP packet. The RTP packet fields are introduced in 
chapter 2.2.1. See of the SRTP additional field descriptions in below. 
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The SRTP data packet contains following additional, configurable length fields: 
 MKI: the value is defined and signaled by key management protocol. 
 Authentication tag: the packet auth. data which is truncated to 32 bit or 80 bit value.  
(Baugher et al. 2004, date of retrieval 26.1.2014) 
 
Within the SRTP cryptographic context, a 16-bit rollover counter (ROC) with a concatenation of a 
32-bit RTP sequence number (SEQ) is used to define a 48-bit packet index variable (SRTP pack-
et index). The ROC is started from a zero value and it’s increased by one whenever sequence 
number is rolled over. The encryption algorithm may be null (no encryption) or AES in counter 
mode. The authentication algorithm is HMAC-SHA1. This algorithm produces 160-bit keystream 
which is truncated to the 80-bit authentication tag by default. Optionally some applications may 
require shorter (32-bit authentication tag) or even null authentication to be used with the SRTP 
packets. A null encryption or authentication and short authentication tag (weak authentication) 
options lead to security risks. The null or short authentication must not be used with the SRTCP 
packets. The weak authentication is acceptable if small amount of forging is acceptable. Also ac-
ceptable when not it’s predictable that attacker can modify a ciphertext to be decrypted with intel-
ligent result. For example with the many codecs, for controlled signal manipulation one needs to 
understand input signal relation to the output signal. The key management protocol produces the 
MKI length information and a value itself. The MKI may identify particular master key within a 
SRTP cryptographic context. (Sisalem et al. 2009, 178; (Baugher et al. 2004, date of retrieval 
2.2.2014) 
 
 
TABLE 1. The structure of the SRTP packet (continues on next page) 
 
B 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
P+A V P X CC M PT Sequence number 
P+A Timestamp 
P+A SSRC 
P+A CSRC 
P+A RTP Extension (Optional) 
E+A Payload 
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E+A Payload (continued) RTP padding RTP pad count 
P SRTP MKI (Optional) 
P Authentication Tag (Recommended) 
 
The SRTCP packet format is illustrated on TABLE 2. Single or first packet of the compound 
RTCP packet header structure is always left unencrypted. The E+A* is describing encrypted and 
authenticated data portion of 2nd until final RTCP packet within compound RTCP packet. Other 
table definitions can be inspected from the TABLE 1 introduction. The RTCP packet fields are 
introduced in chapter 2.2.1. See, description of the SRTCP field additions in below. 
 
The SRTCP data packet contains following additional (new) fields: 
 E-flag: 1 bit, indicates state of the current SRTCP packet encryption 
 SRTCP index: 31 bits, counter of an SRTCP packet, starting from zero  
(Baugher et al. 2004, date of retrieval 26.1.2014) 
 
Within an SRTCP cryptographic context is shared most of the SRTP parameters except no ROC 
value is used. The SRTCP maintains a counter item for number of the handled packets for partic-
ular master key.   
 
 
TABLE 2. The example structure of an (compound) SRTCP packet (continues on next page) 
 
B 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
P+A V P RC PT Length 
P+A SSRC of sender 
E+A Sender Info 
E+A Report Block 1 
E+A … 
E+A Report Block n 
E+A* V P SC PT Length 
E+A* SSRC of CSRC #1 
E+A* SDES items 
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E+A* SDES items (continued) 
P+A E SRTCP Index 
P SRTCP MKI (Optional) 
P Authentication Tag (Mandatory) 
 
 
2.2.2.2 The key derivation algorithm and PRF 
 
The SRTP endpoints shares secret input variables for a key derivation procedure: denoted as 
master key and master salt (both are random variables and salt may be public) via an external 
key management protocol (such as SDES, MIKEY, ZRTP, DTLS-SRTP). The secret keys in 
SRTP key derivation are used in two phases as input parameters to the default cipher: AES. In 
first phase; AES with the PRF produces a set of session keys as result of key derivation: an en-
cryption key, a salting key and an authentication key. The SRTP and SRTCP both have an indi-
vidually derived session keys. The SRTP consist two modes of running AES: AES-CTR and AES 
in f8-mode. In second phase; session keys with data blocks are fed as input parameters to the 
AES cipher in counter mode. (Sisalem et al. 2009, 176-177, 181-183; Baugher et al. 2004, date of 
retrieval 26.1.2014) 
 
The SDES and MIKEY can be classified as a signaling plane key management protocols because 
the SDP attributes are carried in a (signaling) message payloads. Prerequisite from message ex-
change is complication of a SDP offer/answer model in one round trip. The signaling protocol (ie 
SIP) payloads must be integrity protected. Differently the ZRTP and the DTLS-SRTP are classi-
fied as a media plane key management protocols because (key) message exchange and media 
exchange are performed concurrently. Scenarios such as forking, retargeting and early media are 
challenging to the key management protocols. In cases of retargeting and forking the identity of 
the terminating UAS may be different than originally intended by a callee resulting failure to re-
turning message encryption. In early media, the callee may start sending of media already when 
the INVITATION request (with SDP parameters) message is received. This includes media clip-
ping when the caller start receiving of media before the SDP answer needed to derive keying ma-
terial and decrypt receiving message. The early media affects specially for SDES and MIKEY 
because those requires full round trip for the key derivation. The early media is better handled by 
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the media plane key management protocols. In these schemes the media is firstly send unen-
crypted and later changed to the SRTP when the cryptographic context creation are finished by 
endpoints. (Sisalem et al. 2009, 185-186) 
 
For an example let’s consider of two positive integers, named as m (for input block size) and n 
(for label). Two input parameter blocks, named as k and x are placed into the definition of a 
pseudo-random function family in FORMULA 3. Respectively for the given values the secret ran-
dom key k and m-bit sequence are producing the output value of PRF_n(k,x). Output block is an 
n-bit sequence, computationally indistinguishable. (Baugher et al. 2004, date of retrieval 
1.2.2014) 
 
FORMULA 3.  Definition of a pseudo-random function family (PRF) for set of keyed functions 
     (   ) 
 
For the key derivation procedure of SRTP, a secure PRF with input block size m = 128 (keyed by 
128, 192, or 256 bit master key) must be used. Furthermore, key k_master and IV equal to 
(x*2^16) are applied with PRF_n(k_master, x) to produce n-bit output blocks (for n up to 2^23). 
Finally, the produced output block is truncated to the n first (left-most) bits. (Baugher et al. 2004, 
date of retrieval 1.2.2014) 
 
Key derivation rate is defined for a lifetime of current master key. For calculation process, let’s 
define that a DIV t denotes integer division a by t. With non-zero values of t, a DIV t can be im-
plemented as a right-shift by base-2 logarithm of t. By default, SRTP uses a key derivation rate of 
zero. This is interpreted as no key refreshing is used (meaning key derivation shall be taken place 
only once). In addition of above key derivation rate following items are used in key derivation pro-
cedure: a label (an 8-bit constant value), master salt key and a unique index variable for the 
SRTP and the SRTCP in following order. 
 
1) the SRTP or the SRTCP index DIV key derivation rate produces r (rate variable) 
2) the label || r produces key_id (key identifier) 
3) the key_id XOR the master salt with the least significant bits produces x variable (a key-
stream) placed to the PRF function. 
In the SRTP encryption keystream utilizes label value 0x00 and respectively the SRTCP label 
value is 0x03. The SRTP salting key label value is 0x02 and respectively the SRTCP label value 
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is 0x05. Session keys derived from these labels are used for the packet encryption and decryp-
tion. The SRTP authentication keystream utilizes label value 0x01 and respectively the SRTCP 
label value is 0x04. Session keys derived from authentication labels are used to calculate and 
verify the packet MAC values. (Baugher et al. 2004, date of retrieval 1.2.2014)    
 
2.2.2.3 Packet encryption 
 
Conceptually, the cipher encryption of AES in counter mode is modifying sequence of integers 
where the starting point of integer sequence is randomized. In the encryption operation, each 
packet is processed with a distinct keystream block. Produced output keystream shall consist of 
concatenation of 128-bit blocks. The encryption process is described in FORMULA 4. 
 
FORMULA 4.  Encryption of a successive keystream blocks 
 (      )     (                )     (                )   where 
E = encryption function 
k_e = session encryption key, which is 128-bit size sequence of integers 
IV = Initialization Vector, which is 128-bit size sequence of integers 
(Baugher et al. 2004, date of retrieval 2.2.2014) 
 
The IV for SRTP is defined by placing following variables: the SSRC, the SRTP packet index and 
the SRTP session salting key to the 128-bit blocks and in mutual relationship between those via 
the XOR operations. Both of the XOR-sum is padded with necessary leading zeroes to produce 
128-bit block as intermediate and as the final result. Corresponding definitions for SRTCP con-
tains the SSRC of the first compound packet header, the SRTCP packet index from 31-bit packet 
counter with zero prefix bit and SRTCP session keys. The IV block creation is described in FOR-
MULA 5. 
 
FORMULA 5.  Creation of encryption IV block 
   (    
  )  (        )  (     ) where 
k_s = session salting key, which is 112-bit size sequence of integers 
  = XOR operation 
SSRC = the synchronization source identifier 
i = SRTP packet index consisting of ROC || SEQ 
  
 
 
 28 
IV = Initialization Vector, which is 128-bit size sequence of integers 
(Baugher et al. 2004, date of retrieval 2.2.2014) 
 
2.2.2.4 Packet authentication 
 
A packet may be stored and altered along transmission path. Replicated packet may be later re-
injected to the network. Authentication offers protection of replaying packets and sending manipu-
lated packets to receiver. 
 
The SRTP/SRTCP packets are authenticated (integrity protected) after encryption portion is cal-
culated and placed in. An authentication portion is calculated over source message and truncated 
digest value is placed to authentication tag field. In the packet receiving side processing order 
back to the plaintext is performed conversely. The authenticated portion (denoted as M) of the 
SRTP contains header with possible extensions and the encrypted payload section with the con-
catenation of ROC. On the SRTCP side (concerning both single RTCP and compound RTCP 
packets) authentication source portion contains all fields except the MKI and the Authentication 
Tag. (Baugher et al. 2004, date of retrieval 2.2.2014) The HMAC calculation with authentication 
key and authenticated data is described in FORMULA 6. 
 
FORMULA 6.  Authentication keystream blocks 
    (     )  where 
HMAC = keyed-Hashed MAC 
k_a = session authentication key, which is 160-bit size sequence of integers 
M = Authentication portion 
 
2.2.3 Key derivation with SIP & MIKEY 
 
The MIKEY key management protocol may be used to perform key exchange and negotiate the 
security parameters for SRTP. The SRTP is also main use case for the MIKEY although latter is 
independent secure data protocol. The MIKEY messages (I_MESSAGE & R_MESSAGE) are 
embedded in the SDP payloads which are encoded in base64 data format. The I_MESSAGE is 
sent in SDP offer with (SIP) session invitation by an entity called initiator. The optional 
R_MESSAGE is sent back in SDP answer with (SIP OK) session response by another entity 
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called responder. The MIKEY message consists of one header (may be also called to payload) 
followed by number of actual payload sections. (Sisalem et al. 2009, 191) 
 
In the MIKEY exchange data stream security parameters are carried in a Crypto Session (CS), 
one or more CSs form a Crypto Session Bundle (CSB). The CS has unique identifier within a 
CSB which is also identified by unique identifier per initiator and responder pair. For the SRTP CS 
corresponds to an SRTP cryptographic context. The CSB contents (and thus CSs accordingly) 
are carried in a MIKEY message header. The header contains also CS ID map which consists of 
a security policy number, a SSRC and a ROC tuples. (Arkko, Carrara, Lindholm, Naslund, Norr-
man, date of retrieval 9.2.2014; Sisalem et al. 2009, 193) 
 
In addition to the security policies mapping to crypto sessions a key set is created for each CS. 
The MIKEY initiator creates a TEK generation key (TGK) independently and randomly. A key set 
consist either a TGK or a Traffic encryption (TEK) with optional Salt which may be utilized by un-
derlying protocol. 
 
Constant prefix label values for key creation from a TGK: 
 TEK:   0x2AD01C64 
 Salt key:  0x39A2C14B 
 
The label consists of following concatenation of variables: a constant key identifier (Constant val-
ues are described above. The SRTP requires TEK (for SRTP master key) and salt key for 
SRTP’s own key derivation procedures. According to the MIKEY specification it’s also possible to 
derive distinct encryption and authentication keys but those are not meaningful for the SRTP be-
cause of SRTP has own key derivation process.), the CS ID, CSB ID and a random number (car-
ried in RAND payload). (Arkko et al., date of retrieval 9.2.2014) 
 
2.2.3.1 MIKEY PRF description 
 
The MIKEY key derivation bases on a pseudo-random function (also P-function) PRF(input_key, 
label) that uses the HMAC-SHA1 algorithm with a input key. Depending on the desired output key 
the input key can be either a TGK or a pre-shared key PSK (which is introduced in next chapter). 
The P-function is divided to the inner and outer HMAC transformations where inner gets a key 
  
 
 
 30 
and a label as input calculation parameters. A key and output of inner operation concatenated 
with label is fed to outer operation as input parameters. If m variable is equal to 1 then no more 
data processing is needed. If m variable is greater than one then the HMAC operations are con-
tinued as many rounds as m stands for while input parameters are key and output of previous 
HMAC operation concatenated with label. While input parameter length increases single HMAC 
output length is always 160 bits. Depending on the m value the partial output values may be con-
catenated together to get longer final output value. The HMAC operations inside of one P-function 
are described in FORMULA 7 on below. 
 
FORMULA 7.  The MIKEY P-Function 
 (         )      (              )     
    (              )     
    (              )   where 
HMAC = SHA-1 based message authentication function 
A0 = label 
Ai = HMAC(s, A_(i-1)) 
s = secret key 
m = output key length divided by 160, rounded up to the nearest integer  
   = concatenation of two variables 
(Arkko et al., date of retrieval 30.9.2014) 
 
The input data ie key content needs to be divided for blocks of 256 bits in MIKEY PRF procedure. 
For short key lengths only one key block exists. Each block is processed through above P-
function (see FORMULA 7) with divided or complete key block and label. Eventually P-output key 
segments are XOR-operated together to get the final output value. Depending on the desired key 
length only most significant bits are taken from the output to key value. 
 
FORMULA 8.  MIKEY default PRF 
   (           )   (          )   (          )     (          ) where 
s1,s2 = sub-key block of 256-bit 
sn= last (and may be only existing) key block of 256-bit or less 
label = concatenation of constant and random values where constant values depends on case 
which invoked PRF 
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m = output key len divided by 160, rounded up to the nearest integer  
  = XOR operation 
(Arkko et al., date of retrieval 30.9.2014) 
 
Two following figures: FIGURE 3. MIKEY default PRF and FIGURE 4. MIKEY P-Function de-
scribes and visualizes the output key creation in more detail and those can be used together with 
latest formulas to familiarize functionality of the MIKEY PRF and the message key creation. The 
input key is fed through the key splitter which divides the key in blocks of 256-bits which are again 
processed with a P-Function. Depending from the key length the first or the last input key block 
may be shorter than 256-bits. All output key blocks from result of P-Functions are XOR-ed to-
gether to get the final output value. If only one input key block is used (as happens with relatively 
short input key values) then no XOR operation is used in the end.  
 
FIGURE 3. MIKEY default PRF 
(Furht, Kirovski, date of retrieval 15.10.2014) 
 
PRF 
Input Key 
Key 
splitter 
P1 
P2 
Pn 
P-outkey-1 
P-outkey-2 
P-outkey-n 
Outkey 
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FIGURE 4. MIKEY P-Function 
(Furht, Kirovski, date of retrieval 15.10.2014) 
 
 
2.2.3.2 MIKEY key exchange methods 
 
The base version of the MIKEY specifies three following key exchange methods: a pre-shared 
key (MIKEY-PSK), a public key encryption (MIKEY-RSA) and a Diffie-Hellman (MIKEY-DHSIGN). 
The first two methods are based on the key transport functionality, where the TGK is sent to the 
receiver. The latter method exchanges Diffie-Hellman values which are used to derive TGK. From 
symmetric cryptography point of view, the pre-shared key method is the most efficient way to per-
form key transport and has an advantage that relatively small amount of the data need to be ex-
changed. In the next chapters the MIKEY-PSK is studied in more details. Firstly, common header 
payload is created and following payloads are concatenated to header. Each payload identifies 
type of following payload by a Next payload field. Finally step in the MIKEY-PSK procedure is an 
authentication with the MAC over complete message and storing of the digest to MAC field of the 
KEMAC payload. (Arkko et al., date of retrieval 12.1.2014) 
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Payloads of I_MESSAGE: 
 HDR:  The general MIKEY header, including CSB data 
 T:  Timestamp 
 RAND:  Random or pseudo-random byte-string 
 IDx:  Identity of initiator (IDi) or Identity of responder (IDr), optional element 
 SP:  The security policies, one or more entities 
 KEMAC: Key data transport 
 
Payloads of R_MESSAGE (optional): 
 HDR:  The general MIKEY header, including CSB data 
 T:  Timestamp 
 IDx:  Identity of initiator (IDi) or Identity of responder (IDr), optional element 
 V:  MAC calculated verification data 
 
In following FIGURE 5. MIKEY-PSK message exchange method is illustrated.  
 
FIGURE 5. MIKEY-PSK message exchange method 
 
The SDP attribute key-mgmt is used to carry MIKEY key sets in encrypted and authenticated 
form. A key-mgmt attribute contains a key management protocol identifier which is “mikey” in this 
use case. Actual MIKEY message is followed after semicolon in a base64 encoded form. The 
SDP attribute key-mgmt is defined either at the SDP session or media level to negotiate and ex-
change keys. If defined to session level then cryptographic parameters concerns all media 
Initiator Responder 
I_MESSAGE 
R_MESSAGE 
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streams that belong to the concerned multimedia session. The media level definition applies only 
to the RTP session where it is defined and also overwrites possible session level definition. If 
multiple parameters are defined to same session level then answerer may choose one of those to 
following (optional) answer. In addition, the SIP signaling itself should be secured to protect the 
key management messages from a man in the middle attacks.  (Sisalem et al. 2009, 201, date of 
retrieval 25.10.2014) 
 
Key-mgmt attribute (a) follows the ABNF grammar: 
 
 key-mgmt-attribute = key-mgmt-att-field “:” key-mgmt-att-value 
 
The field descriptions shown above are: 
key-mgmt-att-field: key management attribute identifier defined as “key-mgmt” 
key-mgmt-att-value: key management protocol identifier defined as “mikey” with white space and 
concatenated with base64 encoded MIKEY message. For detail descriptions, please see Arkko, 
chapters 3.1. SDP Extensions. (Arkko, Lindholm, Naslund, Norrman, Carrara, 2006, date of re-
trieval 25.10.2014) 
 
In following figures FIGURE 6. Example of an SDP offer with key-mgmt attribute in media level 
and FIGURE 7. Example of an SDP offer with key-mgmt attribute in session level use of MIKEY 
media parameters is described. To simplify these use cases, preliminary SDP parameters are 
omitted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
SDP offer: 
… 
m=audio 49000 RTP/SAVP 98 
a=rtpmap:98 AMR/8000 
a=key-mgmt:mikey AQAFgM0XflABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAsAyONQ6gAAAAAGEEoo2pee4hp2 
UaDX8ZE22YwKAAAPZG9uYWxkQGR1Y2suY29tAQAAAAAAAQAk0JKpgaVkDaawi9whVBtBt 
0KZ14ymNuu62+Nv3ozPLygwK/GbAV9iemnGUIZ19fWQUOSrzKTAv9zV 
m=video 52230 RTP/SAVP 31 
a=rtpmap:31 H261/90000 
FIGURE 6. Example of an SDP offer with key-mgmt attribute in media level 
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The prerequisite for MIKEY-PSK method has achieved when initiator and responder are precon-
figured with a PSK. Both MIKEY endpoints have the responsibility to create message keys for 
encryption and integrity protection via key derivation from shared secret (PSK) in cryptographic 
secure way. The MIKEY message key derivation process itself is similar to MIKEY key derivation 
from TGK introduced earlier chapters. Label consists of concatenation of following variables: a 
constant key identifier, a fixed parameter 0xFF, CSB ID and a random number (carried in RAND 
payload). (Sisalem et al. 2009, 195-196; Arkko et al., date of retrieval 9.2.2014) 
 
Constant values for message key creation from a PSK: 
 Encryption key: 0x150533E1 
 Authentication key:  0x2D22AC75 
 Salting key:  0x29B88916 
 
The content of the TGK is determined by initiator and sent to the responder inside of 
I_MESSAGE. The TGK is encapsulated and encrypted as sub-payload to the KEMAC payload. 
The KEMAC is MIKEY key encrypted data block which contains MAC calculated over encrypted 
initiator message and result of the authentication digest placed to end of the KEMAC payload. 
The Formula 9 defines KEMAC payload creation. (Arkko et al., date of retrieval 11.2.2014) 
 
FORMULA 9.  KEMAC sub-payload encryption and concatenation of authentication digest 
       (   *   +     )  where 
E = encryption function 
Me = MIKEY message encryption key, which is 128-bit size sequence of integers 
TGK = TEK generation key 
SDP offer: 
… 
a=key-mgmt:mikey AQAFgM0XflABAAAAAAAAAAAAA… 
m=audio 49000 RTP/SAVP 98 
a=rtpmap:98 AMR/8000 
m=video 52230 RTP/SAVP 31 
a=rtpmap:31 H261/90000 
FIGURE 7. Example of an SDP offer with key-mgmt attribute in session level 
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{..} = zero or more items 
MAC = authentication digest 
 
Essential for the MIKEY key exchange, next construction of the KEMAC payload data structure is 
studied in more details. In the MIKEY-PSK case, KEMAC payload must be last payload of mes-
sage and it’s signaled by value of zero in Next payload field. The encryption algorithm describes 
method used encrypt data of key data sub-payloads. The selected method is AES-CTR using a 
128-bit encryption key. The authentication algorithm is HMAC-SHA1. (Arkko et al., date of re-
trieval 16.2.2014) 
TABLE 3. The key data transport payload (KEMAC) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Next Payload Encryption Algorithm Encryption data length 
Encrypted data (key data sub-payloads, variable length) 
MAC Algorithm MAC (digest, variable length) 
 
The key data payload contains keying material for the SRTP connection. Type field indicates the 
key set included. The TEK is useful and recommended when pre-encrypted material exist before 
MIKEY keying. The KV field indicates type of key validity period (SPI/MKI is defined by 0b0001, 
Interval is defined by 0b0010) and signals to a SRTP cryptographic content state of MKI indicator 
(see actual data definition in below). Salt (the SRTP Master salt) is included if defined in Type 
field. (Arkko et al., date of retrieval 16.2.2014) 
 
The key data sub-payload type field definitions (in bit values): 
 TGK:  0b0000 
 TGK+Salt:  0b0001 
 TEK:  0b0010 
 TEK+Salt: 0b0011 
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TABLE 4. The key data sub-payloads 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Next Payload Type KV Key data length 
Key data (variable length) 
Salt length Salt data (variable length) 
Key Validity (KV) data (variable length) 
 
The key validity (KV) data is used to specify the SRTP MKI value. The KV itself is not a 
standalone payload but instead sub division of key data sub-payload. The value of KV may be 
null when it is not included. (Arkko et al., date of retrieval 16.2.2014) 
 
 
TABLE 5. The KV data field SPI and Interval definitions based on value of KV field. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SPI Length SPI (variable length) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
VF Length Valid From (variable length) 
VT Length Valid To (variable length) 
 
Sub-payload fields of the KEMAC payload are encrypted with AES algorithm in counter mode. 
Initialization vector for encryption is defined in Formula 9. The MIKEY-PSK may be used with null 
encryption and authentication if security can be guaranteed by SIP (the SDP packet need to be 
encrypted end-to-end). (Arkko et al., date of retrieval 16.2.2014) 
 
FORMULA 9.  Creation of KEMAC encryption IV block 
   (    (                     ))               where 
IV = Initialization Vector, which is 128-bit size sequence of integers 
Ms = MIKEY message salting key, which is 112-bit size sequence of integers 
  = XOR operation 
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CSB ID = Crypto Session Bundle ID, 32-bit 
T = timestamp of T payload, 64-bit 
ctr_value = increased counter, started from zero 
 
2.2.4 Key derivation with SIP & SDES 
 
Like the MIKEY also the SDES offers method to negotiate security key parameters for use of se-
curity protocol such as the SRTP. Keying material of the SDES is transferred using crypto pa-
rameter in a SDP payload. The crypto attribute is encoded in base64 data format and negotiated 
using a SDP offer/answer model (also similar than in the MIKEY). The main difference between 
these two key management transferring methods is that crypto parameter is carried in a cleartext 
form in SDP payload. Therefore the SDES needs encryption and authentication services from 
transmission protocol (the SIP signaling). (Andreasen, Baugher, Wing, Session Description Pro-
tocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for Media Streams. Date of retrieval 15.10.2014) 
The SDES crypto attribute is used only at SDP media level to describe cryptographic suite, key 
and session parameters for ongoing media session or for one being to establish. Crypto attribute 
(a) follows the ABNF grammar: 
 
 attibute = crypto:<tag> <crypto-suite> <key-params> [<session-params>] 
 
The field descriptions shown above are: 
tag: decimal number which is an unique identifier for certain media attribute definitions 
crypto-suite: specified identifier for encryption and authentication algorithms protecting media 
stream. For detail descriptions, please see Andreasen, chapters 6.2. Crypto suites.  
key-params: specifies set of keying material with following structure: 
 
 key-params = <key-method> “:” <key-info> 
 inline: base64(<key> || <salt>)[“||”<lifetime>] [“||”<MKI>”:”<MKI-length>] 
where inline is used as key-method indicator followed by semicolon and actual keys itself. With 
the SRTP key-info contains concatenation of the master and the salt keys and latter result in the 
base64 encoded form. The key-info line may also contain two more optional parameters: lifetime, 
which defines how long keys are enable to use and master key identifier (MKI) which associates 
certain master key to the incoming SRTP packet. If lifetime parameter is missing then following 
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default values are assumed; 248 for the SRTP packets and 231 for the SRTCP packets. If the MKI 
is given then length in bytes is must be followed after semicolon. 
session-params: contains an additional SRTP cryptographic context parameters. For detail de-
scriptions, please see Andreasen, chapters 6. SRTP Security Descriptions. 
(Andreasen et al., date of retrieval 15.10.2014) 
 
A SDP offer or proposal sent to answerer may contain several crypto attribute definitions for me-
dia lines. Answerer accepts one among of all crypto parameters (if any) and attach accepted with 
updated key values to the SDP answer. After receiving of the SDP answer, the initiator may use 
received key set to protect the SRTP media stream. Receiver is capable of decrypting the SRTP 
packets by using master keys known only by media session counterparts. 
 
In following FIGURE 8. Example of SDES offer/answer use of the SDES media parameters is 
described. To simplify this use case, preliminary SDP parameters are omitted. 
 
  
 
 
  
SDP offer: 
… 
m=audio 49170 RTP/SAVP 0 
a=crypto:2 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 
inline:WVNfX19zZzW1jdGwgKCkgewkyMjA7fQp9CnVubGVz|2^20|1:4; 
inline:WKMbsd5KDa8mEond4QsbBa92akDFjfjAJFKsdJHjfeY|2^20|2:4 
 
SDP answer: 
… 
m=audio 32640 RTP/SAVP 0 
a=crypto:1 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 
inline:PS1uQCVeeCFCanVmcjkpPywjNWhcYD0mZZtxeVBR|2^20|1:4 
FIGURE 8. Example of SDES offer/answer 
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3 CREATION OF SECURE RTP FUZZING TEST SUITE 
 
In a model based fuzzing a protocol specification is modeled in principles of a context-free gram-
mar called Backus-Naur Form (BNF). The Codenomicon Defensics native grammar tree format 
(.bbt) is used in the most cases to define protocol model. In addition, the Augmented Backus-
Naur Form (.abnf) or the Abstract Syntax Notation One (.asn) may be used to update a model 
definition. A protocol modeling begins from a start or root symbol. The implemented model is not 
full protocol implementation but it describes a protocol specification and the message exchange 
from black box testing aspects. A test suite file is XML structured file with Codenomicon Defen-
sics .bbx file format extension. The test suite file is used to load protocol model (one or more .bbt 
file(s) with test cases and anomaly library) in a development phase. A final test suite component 
is usable after installation of the Java file (.jar). The test suite loads also rule definitions and user 
settings to the model. Use of rule adds dynamic content handling and calculations to model. One 
special group of rules is defined by input/output (IO) rules which provide test case delivery to the 
SUT. Target parameters and protocol configuration are processed by user settings. Outgoing and 
incoming message handling functionality of the test suite is in most cases implemented by suite 
specific Java package(s). The Eclipse programming environment is used in a Java software de-
velopment. 
 
A test suite is implemented with the valid protocol functionalities. The suite is acting as valid pro-
tocol entity. Suite’s role is a client when it mainly receiving messages or a server when it’s send-
ing messages to the SUT. A valid case is error-free protocol implementation. Valid case is modi-
fied with an anomaly to form of a test case. Test cases are sent as messages to the SUT while 
traversing protocol tree structure. 
 
A simplified description of the test case run is firstly to send a test case (anomaly) and secondly 
verify operation of SUT with sending of a valid test case that except response from the SUT. This 
operation is continued until all test cases are passed or an error situation is encountered. An error 
might appear when tested application is crashed after receiving of test case or is not able to re-
spond valid requests anymore.  
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3.1 Modeling of SRTP Fuzzer Test Suite 
 
The black box model of the RTP consists of rtp-suite.bbx and rtp-model.bbx. Earlier defines name 
and version of the test suite, anomaly library used to produce anomalized messages of protocol 
description. It also makes base groups defined by a test tool developer to divide test cases to the 
logical groups. The latter imports user settings, suite and object rule definitions. It also parses all 
added protocol description files (*.bbt). The RTP and RTCP packet structures with secure exten-
sions from RFC3550 and RFC3771 are defined to model.bbt and it’s secure extension secure-
rtp.bbt protocol modeling file. Boolean user setting sel-srtp from settings.bbx launches creation of 
the secure rtp protocol leaf when enabled by user of the test suite. A type rule instance from rule 
library called type-srtp creates then the SRTP or the SRTCP model leafs to messages which are 
sent to a target application. User settings are accessible before running of the test suite via Pro-
tocol Monitor (PM) user interface or via command line. Below is shown pieces of the model where 
user settings and protocol model description are converged to enable secure rtp leaf modeling. 
 
settings.bbx: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rules.bbx: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please, see also related modeling of the secure-rtp.bbt from appendix 2. 
 
<setting name=”sel-srtp”> 
  <group>RTP Settings[SRTP Options]</group> 
  <description>Secure RTP Selection</description> 
  <command-line true=”—enable-srtp” false=”—disable-srtp”/> 
  <default-value>false</default-value> 
</setting> 
<!—Type rules used to control srtp fields - -> 
<rule built-in=”type” name=”type-srtp”> 
  <setting name=”sel-srtp” param=”set”/> 
</rule> 
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The MIKEY protocol model with default initiator message from RFC3830 is defined to the 
mikey.bbt suite modeling file. The mikey.bbt defines the most of the protocol contents but the 
TGK/TEK keys and the salt key (TEK and salt is used as SRTP master key and salt respectively), 
possible MKI value and authentication signature to be attached end of the MIKEY-I-Message. 
 
3.2 Java package design for SRTP Fuzzer Test Suite 
 
A message handling functionality is implemented to a test run controller component. It responsi-
bility is to send and receive test cases produced by the RTP suite to the SUT over Internet con-
nection. The Message API service offered by platform engine is used to get access and modify 
messages. Overloaded engine methods to be run in normal suite operation are initialize method 
which is called in the start of the suite test run, runTestCase method which is called in the begin 
of every test case, evaluate method may be used to handle suite trigger calls from model. The 
suite triggers contains data of a current tree branch or a leaf. The use of these triggers gives de-
veloper a way to modify sent messages to contain for example the encryption data or authentica-
tion signatures. In examples below, the simplified data flows for encryption and authentication of 
the RTP packets are presented. The SRTP suite trigger definition and implemented controller 
sub-packages are used for cryptographic calculations. Please, see first sample of the rtp packet 
modeling from appendix 1. 
 
Encryption and authentication trigger handlings 
1) A rule trigger definitions in model => !rtp:encrypt (symbol), !rtp:authenticate(symbol) 
 
2) The controller encryption implementation => evaluate(trigger, symbol..) Firstly re-
ceived symbol is evaluated and encryption trigger is identified. Enc. trigger is handled 
first because it’s inner definition in a tree structure (and for a reason it’s specified an 
encryption is calculated always before an authentication calculation over modified 
data). The sequence and plain payload values are evaluated and encoded to byte ar-
ray value.     
 
3) The controller encryption sub-package implementations => A RTP packet modifica-
tions to the SRTP packet for example adding an encryption and an authentication to 
source packets (RTP) using the Java crypto class package (javax.crypto package 
provides the classes and interfaces for cryptographic operations). The packet han-
dling requests the AES cipher object from the keyManager object of RTPKeyManag-
er class and forwards plain data packet to an appropriate sub-package class. The 
encrypted data packet is received as return value and set to the RTP-Payload sym-
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bol using the MessageAPI method calls. In this phase, the encrypted symbol value is 
returned from evaluate() method. 
 
4) The controller authentication implementation => evaluate(trigger, symbol..) Again, 
firstly a received symbol is evaluated and received authentication trigger is identified. 
Next phases are done in a private authenticateData() method; authentication tag 
length is solved from the suite user settings, correct authentication tag symbol is set 
using MessageAPI interface, data from the authentication source symbol is trans-
ferred to a byte array, keyManager object is used to authenticate source data and 
truncate authentication result to the desired length. The authentication tag is set in 
place to the end of message. Final step in authentication is to change result mes-
sage to a symbol via MessageAPI. Edited symbol is next given to a method which 
checks has MKI value in use and sets it in place if necessary. After this, the secure 
rtp packet is ready and evaluated symbol of it is returned from evaluate() method. 
 
5) The controller send() method transmits valid or anomaly SRTP packet to SUT. 
 
There are suite triggers and trigger handling implementation in controller also for the SRTCP 
compound packets. The packet building in this case is a little more multilateral since 1 to n 
SRTCP packets are sent in one message transmission. The first packet header section is plain 
(ie visible) while it’s payload is encrypted likewise all following packets (header and payload) are 
encrypted. The individual SRTCP packet has also length and counter rules which must be evalu-
ated before all packet data is available. All the data to be encrypted is collected until a special 
end trigger (from model) has received which flags from situation where all data is ready to be en-
crypted. After the encrypted data is stored to the message then authentication needs to be done 
over combination of the plain and the encrypted data with the SRTCP encryption bit and the 
SRTCP counter fields. The authentication tag is then placed to the end of message like in case of 
composing the SRTP packet.  
 
There are situations when another protocol services are required. One such case is to do the 
session negotiation with embedded key management protocol between the signaling protocol (for 
example SIP) and the RTP target application (also SUT in fuzzing purpose). The session negotia-
tion phase is performed in suitable place of runTestCase method before sending of the actual test 
case. This phase contains also run of the key management services via sub-classes if the STRP 
settings are selected and activated with selection of the one available key management protocol. 
The utilized Codenomicon controller session negotiation concept is called later on as a Master-
Slave. In this case, the RTP suite role is master and the SIP suite role is slave. The master suite 
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initializes session parameters and sends those in web service (HTTP) request(s) to the slave 
suite to do session negotiation or to request other services. When a media session is established 
between two parties (in this case between slave suite and SUT), the session connection parame-
ters are stored to XML format.  Reading of the XML parameters is available for session originator 
ie Master suite. The master suite concludes session to be activated when owned XML reader 
object’s session parameters differ from a null value where it was firstly initialized. This state ena-
bles call of the IO rule initialization method initRules() where output rule of the RTP suite is up-
dated with negotiated session parameters. In the begin of initRules() also validity of a key man-
agement responses in case of the SDES and the MIKEY are checked via keyManager object. In 
case of valid and changed key management response from previously proposed request then 
changes are stored to the model and the appropriate cipher objects in controller. In case of error 
test suite exception is thrown which stops run of test case. In addition, one important task of the 
slave suite is to maintain activity (ie alive) state of session. The master suite gets regularly up-
dates of session state via these alive-requests. If session is concluded to be terminated and it 
can’t be re-established anymore then master suite signals failure to user as main log entry. The 
slave suite writes session parameters to the output stream according to received response from 
SUT. The master suite uses received session parameters to send RTP/SRTP packets to the 
SUT. Master suite should also observe state of session by the means specified protocol is sup-
porting. That is needed for the reason because RTP is usually implemented on top of a UDP and 
thus can’t easily recognize for example malfunction of a target application. 
 
The implemented controller package may be run to send RTP/SRTP packets to configured target 
directly (so called “pure RTP” mode) or after receiving media target parameters using a session 
negotiation via a signaling suite with the target SUT. In pure RTP mode, to be able use of the se-
cure RTP in effectively setting of the master key to suite and to the SUT are required by user. 
 
Secure components from the Rtp java packet: 
- SecureRTPAlgorithmBase.java (Base class) 
- SecureRTPAES.java  (Subclass) 
- SecureRTPMikey.java  (Subclass) 
- SecureRTPSDES.java  (Subclass) 
 
  
 
 
 45 
The created cipher object is instance of a SecureRTPAlgorithmBase. A subclass definition ex-
tends base class implementation. When a new subclass object is created then also base class 
has to be initialised. The base class has different constructors purposed for object initialization. 
 
3.2.1 Class SecureRTPAlgorithmBase 
 
The SecureRTPAlgorithmBase is abstract (base) class which implements constant definitions in 
CryptoConstants class.  
 
 constructors 
public SecureRTPAlgorithmBase(byte[ ] keyPriv, byte[ ] keySalt, int iEnc, int iAuth) 
- For AES object initialization 
public SecureRTPAlgorithmBase(byte[ ] keyPSK) 
- For MIKEY object initialization 
public SecureRTPAlgorithmBase(boolean isRandom, int iEnc, int iAuth) 
- For SDES object initialization 
 
 method definitions 
public void initializeCipher(byte[ ] keyPayload_upper, byte[ ] keyPayload_lower, byte[ ] 
timeStamp) 
public void initializeCipher(boolean isSRTPMode) 
public abstract byte[ ] handlePacket(byte[ ] plainData, byte[ ] rtpSSRC, int iSeqNbr,  
byte [ ] srtcpInd) 
public abstract byte[ ] authenticatePacket(byte[ ] pdu, int iTagLen) 
public abstract byte[ ] getMasterKey() 
public abstract byte[ ] getSaltKey() 
public abstract void updateKeys(byte[ ] newMasterKey, byte [ ] newSaltKey) 
public void initAESCounter(byte upperCounter, byte lowerCounter) 
public abstract void reset() 
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3.2.2 Class SecureRTPAES 
 
The SecureRTPAES class extends SecureRTPAlgorithmBase and implements RTPConstants 
class. 
 
 constructors 
public SecureRTPAES() 
public SecureRTPAES(int iEnc, int iAuth, byte[ ] privKey, byte[ ] saltKey) 
 
 overridden (base class) methods 
public void initializeCipher(byte[ ] keyPayload_upper, byte[ ] keyPayload_lower, byte[ ] 
timeStamp) 
public byte[ ] handlePacket(..) 
public byte[ ] authenticatePacket(..) 
public byte[ ] getMasterKey() 
public byte[ ] getSaltKey() 
public void updateKeys(..) 
public void initAESCounter(..) 
public void reset() 
 
 protected or private methods 
protected void createRawKey(byte[ ] keyCipherInput, byte label, int incCounter) 
private void initCipher() 
private void prepareIv(boolean updRTP) 
private void deriveAuthKey(boolean isSRTPMode) 
private byte[ ] transformPacket(byte[ ] dataPayload, byte[ ] rtpSSRC, int iSeqNbr, byte[ ] srtcpInd) 
 
The SecureRTPAESTest.java is used to run unit tests for implementation of class Secur-
eRTPAES. Test vectors were created from document sources of Dworkin, Special Publication 
800-308A: 2001. chapter F.5 CTR Example Vectors, pages 55-56 and of Baugher, RFC3711 
chapters B.2. AES-CM Test Vectors and B.3. Key Derivation Test Vectors, pages 51-53. Docu-
mented test vector sources were compared to results in an encryption, a decryption and an au-
thentication of packets. Unit test results were corresponding to the results of source documents.  
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3.2.3 Class SecureRTPMikey 
 
The SecureRTPMikey class extends SecureRTPAlgorithmBase and implements RTPConstants 
class. 
 
 constructors 
public SecureRTPMikey() 
public SecureRTPMikey(byte[ ] mikeyPSK) 
 
 overridden (base class) methods 
public void initializeCipher(boolean isSRTPMode) 
public byte[ ] handlePacket(..) 
public byte[ ] authenticatePacket(..) 
public byte[ ] getMasterKey() 
public byte[ ] getSaltKey() 
public void updateKeys(..) 
public void initAESCounter(..) 
public void reset() 
 
 protected or private methods 
protected void createRawKey(byte[ ] keyCipherInput, byte label, int incCounter) 
private void initCipher() 
private void prepareIv(boolean initIV) 
private int getNumberOfHMACIterations(int outKeyLen) 
private byte[ ][ ] splitInKey(byte[ ] inKey) 
private void doKeyDerivation() 
private byte[ ] prfMikey(byte[ ] inKey, byte[ ] keyLabel) 
private byte[ ] [ ] p_HashFunction(byte[ ] secret, byte[ ] sesLabel, int numberOfIter) 
private void createTGK() 
private byte[ ] createMIKEYKeyLabel(String strKeyConst, Boolean tgkKey) 
private void cutKeyResult(String keyPrefix, byte[ ] keyRawData) 
private void clearVar() 
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The SecureRTPMikeyTest.java is used to run basic unit tests for implementation of class Secur-
eRTPMikey. There were no test vectors available for verify key creation and cipher or authentica-
tion functionality.  
 
3.2.4 Class SecureRTPSDES 
 
The SecureRTPSDES class extends SecureRTPAlgorithmBase and implements RTPConstants 
class. 
 
 constructors 
public SecureRTPSDES() 
public SecureRTPSDES(boolean isRandom, int iEnc, int iAuth) 
 
 overridden (base class) methods 
public void initializeCipher(boolean isSRTPMode) 
public byte[ ] handlePacket(..) 
public byte[ ] authenticatePacket(..) 
public byte[ ] getMasterKey() 
public byte[ ] getSaltKey() 
public void updateKeys(..) 
public void initAESCounter(..) 
public void reset() 
 
 protected or private methods 
private void createKeySecrets() 
private void authenticateSecrets() 
 
Unit test class was not created for SDES. The SecureRTPSDES.java simply creates keys to be 
used with the signaling protocol SIP and the SDP Security Descriptions as key management pro-
tocol. The RTP controller checks key validity from the session response and gives warning if keys 
are not acceptable or if the MKI is missing when it was requested. The SDES key management 
functionality was tested with the SFLPhone as negotiator and actor of the SRTP SUT.   
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4 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This project was versatile learning experience for many technology areas which was not well 
mastered by the author beforehand. One side of the project was an interesting and equally chal-
lenging journey to the world of cryptography. To studying, examining and familiarizing the ciphers 
functionality, authentication principles took some time more than was originally planned. Also it 
took some amount of time to understand profoundly of AES / AES-CTR encryption and HMAC 
SHA-1 authentication calculations and for example an idea how PRFs are working in generally by 
studying RFC documentation and NIST specifications. 
 
The target applications for testing were run on virtual machines. The Oracle VirtualBox was used 
to setup virtual machine environment and the Linux based Ubuntu and Lubuntu were used as 
operation systems. Some difficulties were faced when installing and configuring applications to be 
used for testing. Library dependencies in making and in installing software caused conflicts during 
the process which forced to look for help from the Internet. This is quite common in Linux envi-
ronments where software releases appears fairly often and then guides and instructions get obso-
leted for the new version of operation system and application versions available with it. Author 
had only some previous experience of Linux systems so this was very educational also in that 
sense. 
 
There were some complexity and challenges also with the MIKEY used as the key management 
protocol. To understand of how both the MIKEY PRF and how the HMAC authentication are pro-
cessed and calculated needed careful studies and thinking because specification approach is 
planned and targeted to be in quite universal level for protocols using the MIKEY as key man-
agement although the SRTP was targeted to be main use case of a MIKEY. The MiniSIP as tar-
get software for the MIKEY is open source product. It was made and developed by group of stu-
dents in Swedish university but which activity has stopped many years ago. There is one clear 
error in the MiniSIP software which noticed during development. According to Arkko, chapter 5. 
Example Scenarios. (Arkko et al., date of retrieval 21.11.2014) one specified alternative is that 
the MIKEY line can be placed to session level which then protects all underlying media level de-
scriptions. Other option is to place the MIKEY line to one specific media level description which 
then protects only concerning video or audio description. When the MIKEY line was placed to 
media level then the MiniSIP application accepts request with OK answer without checking the 
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given MIKEY parameter. Parameter is supported in session level better but authentication did not 
get accepted despite of careful checking of model and controller implementation. There are two 
remaining possibilities of an authentication error. It’s either an error in author’s MIKEY implemen-
tation because two MiniSIP implementation works when those are set to communicate with each 
other or there is implementation mistake hiding in the MiniSIP implementation which is not de-
tected yet. But either possibility has not proven to exist. 
 
Currently testing of the SRTP tool is about to finish while this MIKEY authentication issue one 
bigger problem which has not been resolved yet. Several test applications were used to test how 
the SRTP tool can cope with different kind of use scenarios. The testing phase is very important 
and useful since not all use cases are not possible to see or think through beforehand. During the 
testing many errors were found and fixed to product and thus released tool is much more robust 
product. Software used as target applications were: 
 
 Twinkle -> for SIP session negotiation and for RTP packets no SRTP support 
 SJPhone -> for SIP session negotiation with SDES key management and 
for SRTP packets 
 MiniSIP -> for SIP session negotiation with MIKEY key management and 
for SRTP packets 
 
In this work was concentrated mainly to use the SIP suite as primary slave suite for the 
RTP/SRTP suite as master suite. The SIP suite can be run either stand-alone (ie normal) or slave 
mode. All SIP side implementation has been omitted in this thesis work report to keep report size 
in reasonable level. In the next this effort is mentioned in few words. Use of SIP as slave suite 
has required a quite amount of SIP model studying and doing of required model additions. Also 
significant amount of a Java programming and debugging have been done to the SIPSlaveServ-
ice class (which could be called as Master/Slave interface to SIP Java packet), the SIPRule class 
(main class of SIP), the SIPRegistration class and the SIPDigestAuthentication class. During the 
work, the SIP implementation and functionality is become more and more familiar and now doing 
of changes SIP implementation is now much more smoother by author when compared to early 
days in this task. Also later on it was considered with other tool developers to separate SIP slave 
from stand-alone functionality to ease of making changes either one of functional entities and not 
making of defect by mistake to the other entity. 
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Further development of the SRTP (so called re-organization) is planned with management of the 
company and implementation work is started by author. The product is currently based on se-
quence files (.seq) which are editable by user and to capture files (.pcap) of real media data 
transfer or streaming traffic. In the near future product is planned to be changed use only capture 
files of real traffic to make valid and fuzzed (S)RTP test cases based on loaded traffic capture file. 
The product will offer default media clip in different formats or user can load on he/she own media 
clips used for testing to target suite. Regardless of the loaded media clip the test case will begin 
with (S)RTCP Receiver Report (RR) with SDES packet and contain next burst of (S)RTP packets 
based on loaded media content. The (S)RTCP packets are defined to model and attached to 
send test cases in controller. Selection of the included (S)RTCP packets can be controller from 
user interface. Also number of new or changed user settings will be introduced. Some of these 
are introduced below.  
 
 Number of burst packet can be controlled. 
 SSRC value with fixed default value for use of RTP stream and also possible set by user 
 Payload type can be selected from predefined numerical values and in case of dynamical 
payload type also payload format can be selected and/or defined new format. 
 Packet delay (between sent packets) setting has default value which may be overridden.  
 
Support for the Session Announcement Protocol (SAP) is needed to add for product to interoper-
ate with some group of streaming applications. Sending of the SAP announcement packet before 
the RTP test cases opens channel (address and port) from target application to receive (S)RTP 
media traffic which is fuzzed test cases in this use case. Use of the SAP announcement option 
will be controlled by user setting.  
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Here is sample of RTP packet modeling. RTP-Packet is root symbol. !rtp* are trigger definitions. 
[xy] is how optional symbol is defined.  
 
# RTP Packet format 
RTP-Packet = !rtp-authenticate ( 
  auth-source 
  SRTP-Trailer 
) 
auth-source = ( 
  RTP-Header 
  rtp-encryption 
) 
rtp-encryption = !rtp:encrypt ( 
  RTP-Payload 
  [PaddingOctets] 
) 
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Common modeling (common.bbt) 
bit = (0b0 | 0b1) 
octet = 0x00-0xFF 
 
Example of Secure RTP modeling (secure-rtp.bbt)  
SRTP-trailer = ( 
  !type-strtp:get [srtp-elements] 
) 
SRTCP-fields = ( 
  !type-strtp:get [srtcp-fields] 
) 
SRTCP-trailer = ( 
  !type-strtp:get [srtp-elements] 
) 
# SRTP lower elements 
srtp-mki-value = 1..n(octet) 
srtp-mki = [srtp-mki-value] 
 
# OPTIONAL MKI and auth 
srtp-elements = ( 
  .MKI:   srtp-mki 
  .Auth-tag:  auth-tag 
) 
# SRTCP lower elements 
srtcp-fields = ( 
  .E:   e-bit-value 
  .SRTCP-Index: srtcp-index-selection 
) 
e-bit-value = (!type-cipher:get(0b0|0b1) | bit) 
srtcp-index-selection = (!srtcp-index 31(bit) | bit)) 
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auth-tag = !srtp-auth-tag:get ( 
     .Auth-Tag-32: auth-tag-32 
  |  .Auth-Tag-80: auth-tag-80 
) 
auth-tag-32 = 4(octet) 
auth-tag-80 = 10(octet) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
